



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-2884

REPORT  
NO. 91-094

June 14, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (FINANCIAL  
MANAGEMENT)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (RESEARCH,  
DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION)

SUBJECT: Final Quick-Reaction Report on the Audit of the  
Acquisition Management of the Advanced Antitank Weapon  
System-Medium - Supplemental Interim Medium Antitank  
System (Project No. OAL-0073.01)

Introduction

The Army is conducting tests of three antitank weapon systems to determine which one is the superior system. The system selected as the superior system could be designated to serve as the Army's interim medium antitank system until the Advanced Antitank Weapon System-Medium (AAWS-M) is fielded. During the subject audit, we identified a fourth existing antitank weapon system, the Swiss Dragon W/H 90 (the Swiss Dragon), that could offer DoD substantial cost and operational benefits. However, the Army had not included the Swiss Dragon as a candidate in the tests. Since the Army is testing the missiles, immediate action is needed to include the Swiss Dragon in the tests so that the Army will have an opportunity to take advantage of the potential cost and operational benefits offered by the missile system.

Background

In 1978, the Army approved a Mission Element Needs Statement that identified deficiencies in the Army's antiarmor weapon systems. The Army's medium system, the Dragon, was one of the deficient systems identified. In 1984, the Army approved the AAWS-M concept, which would replace the Dragon, and an initial operational capability was projected for the mid-1990's.

In 1985, Congress designated funds and directed the Army to evaluate foreign weapon systems to determine their suitability for use as an interim medium antitank system for the Army. During calendar years 1985 through 1988, the Army conducted foreign weapon systems evaluations as directed by Congress. The Army evaluated the French and German Missile d'Infanterie Leger Anti-char (MILAN) and the Swedish Bofors Infantry Light and Lethal

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(BILL), as well as the U.S. Dragon, Generation II (Dragon II). This weapon system evaluation became the Supplemental Interim Medium Antitank System (SIMATS) Program.

Section 114 of the FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act (the Act) directed the Secretary of the Army to select an interim medium antitank system based on the test results of the MILAN, BILL, and Dragon II. Also, the Act required the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, to make an independent assessment of the SIMATS test results. In March 1989, the U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency issued its evaluation report stating that the:

- MILAN was neither marginally effective nor operationally suitable;

- BILL was marginally effective but not operationally suitable; and

- Dragon II was both marginally effective and operationally suitable.

On April 27, 1989, the Army notified Congress that the Army selected the Dragon II as the Army's interim medium antitank system. On May 24, 1989, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, issued his assessment of the test results. The assessment concluded that the BILL was the most effective and was operationally suitable. Congress, apparently not satisfied with the Army's selection of the Dragon II, directed the Secretary of the Army to conduct a side-by-side test of the MILAN, BILL, and Dragon II and select the superior system. This direction was included in section 254 of the FY 1990 Act.

The Army substituted the MILAN 2T (improved missile with a tandem warhead), because the foreign contractor would not furnish the unimproved version of MILAN. The Army started testing the BILL in November 1990, and the final report covering all three missile systems is due to Congress on March 15, 1992. However, as of May 24, 1991, contractual arrangements with the foreign contractor for providing the MILAN 2T for testing had not been completed. If an agreement cannot be reached to facilitate the delivery of hardware by July 1991, the Army's position is that the MILAN 2T should be dropped from the test.

### Discussion

The Government of Switzerland improved the Dragon II and named the improved version the Swiss Dragon. These improvements included a tandem warhead to make the missile effective against reactive armor (tank protection technology) and a decreased launch signature to increase the probability of gunner survivability.

The Swiss Dragon offers the Army certain cost and operational benefits that are not offered by each of the three missiles that the Army plans to test. Specifics on the benefits of the Swiss Dragon follow.

Tank-Killing Capability. The Swiss Dragon offers the Army the capability to defeat reactive armor. Of the three missiles being tested, only the two foreign missiles have the potential to defeat reactive armor. However, the integration of either of these two foreign missiles into the U.S. Forces would be more costly than the integration of the Swiss Dragon into the U.S. Forces. The other system included in the test, the Dragon II, is not effective against reactive armor.

Gunner Survivability. The Swiss Dragon offers the Army improved gunner survivability in launch signature over the three systems being tested. A primary factor affecting gunner survivability was launch signature. Launch signature is the visible flash that results from the launch of the missile. All three systems planned for testing have similar launch signatures. However, one of the improvements made to the Dragon II that resulted in the Swiss Dragon was a reduction of the launch signature. The Swiss reduced the time that the launch flash was visible from approximately 2.5 seconds for the Dragon II to less than .5 seconds for the Swiss Dragon.

Portability by Field Troops. The Swiss Dragon, which weighs 62 pounds, offers the Army portability similar to the Dragon II, which weighs 59 pounds. The two foreign systems included in the test were the least portable. The BILL weighed 119 pounds, and the MILAN weighed 113 pounds (exact weight of MILAN 2T is unknown).

Logistics Support. The Swiss Dragon offers the Army cost benefits in the establishment of logistics support, as opposed to either the BILL or MILAN 2T. The selection of the Dragon II as the Army's interim system would not impact logistics support because the system is currently in the hands of the U.S. Forces. However, the integration of the BILL or the MILAN 2T into the U.S. Forces would require the establishment of a logistics support system, including supply and maintenance. If the Swiss Dragon were added to the SIMATS Program and were eventually selected as the Army's interim system, little, if any, change in logistics support would be required. The Swiss Dragon uses the same launch system as the Dragon II.

Training. The Swiss Dragon offers the Army cost and operational benefits in training, as opposed to both the BILL and MILAN 2T. The integration of either the BILL or the MILAN 2T into the U.S. Forces would require training of the soldiers in the operation of these foreign weapon systems. Because the Swiss Dragon was a modification of the Dragon II missile with no change to the launch system, little, if any, additional training would be required.

Fielding. The Swiss Dragon offers the Army operational benefits in the time required to field an interim system, as opposed to the BILL and MILAN 2T. We believe that the Swiss Dragon could be fielded before either the BILL or the MILAN 2T could be fielded, because the Swiss Dragon is an improved version of the Dragon II, which is already in the hands of U.S. Forces. Also, the Swiss Dragon uses the same launch system as the Dragon II. Army officials informed us that an interim system could not be fielded much sooner than the AAWS-M; therefore, there is no need for an interim system other than the Dragon II. However, according to a June 6, 1991 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meeting, the AAWS-M Program will be extended by at least 18 months. The total length of the extension is scheduled to be decided at a June 26, 1991 meeting of the DAB. Therefore, the Army's need for an effective interim medium antitank system may be greater than originally believed.

#### Management Position

We asked SIMATS Project Office personnel why the Swiss Dragon was not included in the SIMATS tests. The personnel responded that they were not aware of the Swiss Dragon and its potential capabilities. Also, they stated that the program was being conducted at the direction of Congress, and Congress did not require that the Swiss Dragon be included in the SIMATS testing. We agree that Congress did not require the Swiss Dragon to be included; however, Congress did not require that the MILAN 2T be included in the SIMATS testing. We believe that the inclusion of the Swiss Dragon would be within the intent of the congressional direction to identify the best interim medium antitank system.

The Dragon II was manufactured for the DoD by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and the Swiss Dragon was manufactured in Switzerland under license of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation. On January 9, 1991, representatives of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation met with the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research) and presented a proposal to include, in the SIMATS Program, the U.S. Dragon II retrofitted with a tandem warhead. Following this meeting, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition) agreed that the U.S. Dragon II with a tandem warhead could be included in the SIMATS Program. However, the Assistant Secretary made this agreement under the condition that the McDonnell Douglas Corporation provide the required hardware free. To our knowledge, other modifications made by the Government of Switzerland to the Dragon II, such as the reduction of the firing signature, were not addressed. The McDonnell Douglas Corporation decided not to provide the hardware free. Therefore, neither the Swiss Dragon nor the Dragon II retrofitted with a tandem warhead, as proposed by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, was included in the SIMATS Program as of May 24, 1991.

## Conclusion

If the Army does not include the Swiss Dragon in the test, the Army may be depriving itself of having the most effective and operationally suitable weapon system designated as the Army's interim medium antitank system. Without the Swiss Dragon included in the test, the BILL or MILAN 2T could be determined to be the superior system and designated as the Army's interim system. The integration of the BILL or MILAN 2T into the U.S. Forces would be more costly than the Swiss Dragon because the Swiss Dragon is a modified Dragon II, which is already used by the U.S. Forces. Potential monetary benefits and other benefits of the audit are summarized in Enclosure 3.

## Recommendation for Corrective Action

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition) include the Swiss Dragon W/H 90 in the Army's Supplemental Interim Medium Antitank System Program.

## Management Comments

We provided a draft of this report to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management) on March 22, 1991, for comments. On April 5, 1991, we received comments from the Director for Missile Systems, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition). A complete text of the comments is shown in Enclosure 1.

The Director for Missile Systems nonconcurred with the recommendation mainly because the Army is opposed to any interim system. The Director stated that even if the Swiss Dragon were included in the congressionally mandated test program and won the test competition, the Army would not alter its position of opposing an interim system. The Director added that he saw no cost or operational benefits of having an interim system. The Director also stated that including the Swiss Dragon in the test would cost \$1.3 million, which was not available and would extend the test program an additional 6 months. This would preclude the Army from meeting a reporting date to Congress.

## Audit Response to Management Comments

We disagree with the Director's comments. We believe that inaction on the recommendation could prove costly to the Army and DoD. Also, the Director's concerns regarding the added cost to test and the congressional reporting dates should not be insurmountable obstacles. As such, we ask that the Director for Missile Systems reconsider his position in providing comments to the final report. Enclosure 2 contains additional audit responses to management comments.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all audit recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, the Director for Missile Systems must provide final comments on the recommendation by July 1, 1991. As required by DoD Directive 7650.3, the comments must indicate concurrence or nonconcurrence in the finding and recommendation. If you concur, describe the corrective actions taken or planned, the completion dates for actions already taken, and the estimated dates for completion of planned actions. If you nonconcur, you must state your specific reasons. If appropriate, you may propose alternative methods for accomplishing the desired improvements.

The courtesies extended to the audit staff are appreciated. If you have any questions on this audit, please contact Mr. Rayburn H. Stricklin at (703) 614-3965 (DSN 224-3965) or Mr. William D. Van Hoose at (703) 693-0382 (DSN 223-0382). A listing of activities we visited or contacted during our review is in Enclosure 4, and a list of audit team members is in Enclosure 5. The planned distribution of this report is listed in Enclosure 6.



Robert J. Lieberman  
Assistant Inspector General  
for Auditing

Enclosures

cc:  
Secretary of the Army

# Management Comments: Department of the Army



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0100



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## MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Draft Quick-Reaction Report on the Audit of the Acquisition Management of the Supplemental Interim Medium Antitank System.

1. The recommendation of the Draft Quick-Reaction Report, dated 22 Mar 91, is that the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition) include the Swiss Dragon W/H 90 in the Army's Supplemental Interim Medium Antitank System Program.

2. The Army nonconcurs with the recommendation for the following reasons:

a. The Army has gone on record as being opposed to any interim system. AAMS-M is the Army's committed course of action and has so testified before Congress. Incorporating Dragon Swiss W/H 90 would in no way alter the Army's position, even if selected. Hence, no cost and operational benefits are foreseen.

b. To incorporate the Swiss Dragon W/H 90 into the SIMATS test program at this time would involve modifying the current contract, taking additional Dragon II missiles out of stock for conversion to this configuration and rerunning technical and operational tests.

|                |                 |
|----------------|-----------------|
| Hardware Costs | \$259.5K        |
| Test Costs     | \$813.5K        |
| Program Mgmt   | <u>\$220.0K</u> |
| Total          | \$1306.5K       |

c. The FY 91 House Appropriations Committee designated the SIMATS test as a Congressional interest item. Congressional approval is required should funding requirements exceed \$10M in FY88 funds and adding the Swiss W/H 90 would push the test costs over \$10M. Testing the Swiss Dragon W/H 90 will require additional funds in the amount of \$1.3M and Congressional approval.

d. The SIMATS final report is scheduled to be provided to Congress on 15 Mar 92 with an interim report to Congress on 15 Jan 92. The final report to Congress was initially 1


Nov 91 but was delayed because of contractual difficulties with the Milan consortium.. It is estimated that Swiss Dragon W/H 90 missiles with inert warheads would not be delivered for 6 months after funding and program approval. Given funding and program approval as soon as 1 June 91, operational testing would be delayed from Jul/Aug 91 to Jan/Feb 92. A final report could be provided to Congress in Sep 92. This does not meet Congressional intent of a timely report and would appear to Congress as a delay tactic.

e. The current SIMATS test is limited to probability of hit and probability of kill. The selection of an interim system will consider not only tank killing capability, but gunner survivability, portability by field troops, countermeasures vulnerability, system reliability, safety and cost effectiveness as indicated in the Congressional language. The impacts on cost, force structure, airborne requirements etc., still remain in selecting an interim system. With or without the Swiss Dragon W/H 90 the major deficiencies of all the candidates still exist and will again be considered in determining the superior weapon system.

f. The AAWS-M First Unit Equipped is now June 95. Even with the restructure of the AAWS-M Full Scale Development program the utility of an interim system is only 15-20 months given type classification in 18-24 months. The 6 month delay caused by the implementation of Swiss Dragon W/H 90 would reduce the utility of an interim system to 9-14 months before AAWS-M is fielded.

g. Congressional language stipulated that either interim system selected must be ready to enter production by the start of fiscal year 1991. The Swiss Dragon W/H 90 did not meet this criteria when the concept test plan was prepared and, therefore, was not considered as a candidate. McDonnell Douglas signed a contract to support the SIMATS test with Dragon II. To type classify the Dragon IIT would take 18-24 months and approximately \$1.5M. This would be required in order to field the system to U.S. troops.

3. The Army's position continues to be to accept the Dragon II as the interim system.

  
Richard D. Kline  
Colonel, GS  
Director, Missile Systems



## MANAGEMENT'S COMMENTS WITH AUDIT RESPONSES

Management's reasons for its nonconcurrency with the recommendation, as well as our responses to management's comments, are detailed below.

### Management's Comments

The Army has gone on record as being opposed to any interim system. AAWS-M is the Army's committed course of action and has so testified before Congress. Incorporating Dragon Swiss W/H 90 would in no way alter the Army's position, even if selected. Hence, no cost and operational benefits are foreseen.

Audit Response. We were aware of the Army's opposition to the congressionally directed testing program. However, the Army's opposition to an interim system does not mean that there will not be an interim system. Congress has stated since 1985 that there was a need for an interim system and in 1990 identified \$10 million of FY 1988 funds that the Army could use for testing to identify an interim system. If Congress prevails on the issue and directs the Army to acquire an interim system, the Army could experience significant cost consequences. More specifically, considering the three systems (the Swedish Bofors Infantry Light and Lethal [BILL], the French and German Missile d'Infanterie Leger Antichar [MILAN], and the U.S. Dragon, Generation II [Dragon II]) that the Army was testing under the Supplemental Interim Medium Antitank System (SIMATS) Program, it is likely that the BILL or MILAN will win the test competition because both purportedly have capabilities against reactive armor that are superior to the Dragon II. As such, the Army could be faced with paying for the introduction of a totally new weapon system (either the BILL or MILAN) into the Army. The potential for such cost consequences could be reduced, possibly eliminated, by including the Swiss Dragon, which purportedly is also effective against reactive armor, in the SIMATS Program. If the Swiss Dragon wins the testing competition, it should be less costly to incorporate the Swiss Dragon into the Army's inventory than the BILL or MILAN.

There is another advantage to including the Swiss Dragon in the SIMATS Program. If the Swiss Dragon proves to be effective against reactive armor, the investment in the Swiss Dragon could reduce planned investments in the Advanced Antitank Weapon System-Medium (AAWS-M) Program. One of the purposes of the AAWS-M is to provide a capability to defeat reactive armor. As such, if the Swiss Dragon is effective against reactive armor, the planned procurement quantity of AAWS-M missiles could possibly be reduced.

## MANAGEMENT'S COMMENTS WITH AUDIT RESPONSES (cont'd)

### Management Comments

To incorporate the Swiss Dragon W/H 90 into the SIMATS test program at this time would involve modifying the current contract, taking additional Dragon II missiles out of stock for conversion to this configuration and rerunning technical and operational tests.

|                |                  |
|----------------|------------------|
| Hardware Costs | \$ 259.5K        |
| Test Costs     | \$ 813.5K        |
| Program Mgmt   | <u>\$ 220.0K</u> |
| Total          | \$1306.5K        |

Audit Response. We assume that the contract modification that the Army refers to pertained to the McDonnell Douglas Corporation contract for providing Dragon II missiles for the test program. However, our recommendation pertained to the Swiss Dragon, which would be obtained through the Government of Switzerland. Additionally, we do not agree that the Army would be required to rerun technical and operational tests. The technical testing of the BILL and Dragon II was conducted separately, and no operational testing had been conducted as of May 24, 1991. If the Swiss Dragon were included in the test program, technical and operational tests would have to be conducted for that system, but there would be no need to rerun previous technical tests of the Dragon II and BILL.

### Management Comments

The FY 91 House Appropriations Committee designated the SIMATS test as a Congressional interest item. Congressional approval is required should funding requirements exceed \$10M in FY88 funds and adding the Swiss W/H 90 would push the test costs over \$10M. Testing the Swiss Dragon W/H 90 will require additional funds in the amount of \$1.3M and Congressional approval.

## MANAGEMENT'S COMMENTS WITH AUDIT RESPONSES (cont'd)

Audit Response. We question whether there is a need for funding in excess of the \$10 million that was identified by Congress. The MILAN contractor has indicated that an agreement for procurement of its system cannot be reached. Therefore, the MILAN may not be included in the tests. Foreign appropriation funds designated for testing of the MILAN could be used to procure the Swiss Dragon from the Government of Switzerland for testing. Even if funding over \$10 million is required, it would appear worthy of requesting congressional approval considering the potential cost and operational benefits that could be realized for \$1.3 million.

### Management Comments

The SIMATS final report is scheduled to be provided to Congress on 15 Mar 92 with an interim report to Congress on 15 Jan 92. The final report to Congress was initially 1 Nov 91 but was delayed because of contractual difficulties with the Milan consortium.. [sic] It is estimated that Swiss Dragon W/H 90 missiles with inert warheads would not be delivered for 6 months after funding and program approval. Given funding and program approval as soon as 1 June 91, operational testing would be delayed from Jul/Aug 91 to Jan/Feb 92. A final report could not be provided to Congress in Sep 92. This does not meet Congressional intent of a timely report and would appear to Congress as a delay tactic.

Audit Response. We agree that inclusion of the Swiss Dragon into the SIMATS tests could delay the submission of the report to Congress. However, Congress may be receptive to granting a reporting extension considering the potential cost and operational benefits that the Army may realize by including the Swiss Dragon in the SIMATS Program.

### Management Comments

The current SIMATS test is limited to probability of hit and probability of kill. The selection of an interim system will consider not only tank killing capability, but gunner survivability, portability by field troops, countermeasures vulnerability, system reliability, safety and cost effectiveness as indicated in the Congressional language. The impacts on

MANAGEMENT'S COMMENTS WITH AUDIT RESPONSES (cont'd)

cost, force structure, airborne requirements etc., still remain in selecting an interim system. With or without the Swiss Dragon W/H 90 the major deficiencies of all the candidates still exist and will again be considered in determining the superior weapon system.

Audit Response. We do not question the numerous factors that the Army stated will be considered in selecting an interim system. However, if the Swiss Dragon is not included in the SIMATS Program, the Army will not have data on an essential performance characteristic of the Swiss Dragon -- its tank killing capability. We believe that performance data on the Swiss Dragon, obtained from SIMATS testing, would be necessary if the Army changed its position on the interim system. A change to the Army's position could result from additional delays or termination of the AAWS-M Program.

Management Comments

The AAWS-M First Unit Equipped is now June 95. Even with the restructure of the AAWS-M Full Scale Development program the utility of an interim system is only 15-20 months given type classification in 18-24 months. The 6 month delay caused by the implementation of Swiss Dragon W/H 90 would reduce the utility of an interim system to 9-14 months before AAWS-M is fielded.

Audit Response. The achievability of the AAWS-M First Unit Equipped date of June 1995 is questionable. On June 6, 1991, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) rejected the Army's proposed restructure of the AAWS-M Program. The DAB directed the Army to revise its proposed restructured program so that it will contain less risk and to present the revised program to the DAB on June 26, 1991. Therefore, the period of utility would probably be longer than the 9 to 14 months suggested by the Army.

MANAGEMENT'S COMMENTS WITH AUDIT RESPONSES (cont'd)

Management Comments

Congressional language stipulated that either interim system selected must be ready to enter production by the start of fiscal year 1991. The Swiss Dragon W/H 90 did not meet this criteria when the concept test plan was prepared and, therefore, was not considered as a candidate. McDonnell Douglas signed a contract to support the SIMATS test with Dragon II. To type classify the Dragon IIT would take 18-24 months and approximately \$1.5M. This would be required in order to field the system to U.S. troops.

Audit Response. Information that we obtained indicated that the Swiss Dragon was in production at the start of FY 1991, while the MILAN 2T (improved missile with a tandem warhead) was not ready for production at the start of FY 1991. A representative of the Government of Switzerland informed us that 200 Swiss Dragon missiles were produced during mid-1989, which was before the preparation of the SIMATS Evaluation Concept Paper, dated May 22, 1990. The FY 1990 National Defense Authorization Act stated that the MILAN would be tested; however, the Army substituted the MILAN 2T, which was not ready for production by the start of FY 1991. Management's comments referred to a Dragon IIT; however, our recommendation pertained to the Swiss Dragon. The Dragon IIT is a modification of the Dragon II proposed by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation that has never been produced.

SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL MONETARY AND OTHER  
BENEFITS RESULTING FROM AUDIT

| <u>Recommendation<br/>Reference</u> | <u>Description of Benefit</u>  | <u>Amount and/or<br/>Type of Benefit</u>   |
|-------------------------------------|--|--|
| A.                                  | Program Results. Will ensure that the antitank weapon system offering the most cost and operational benefits is selected as an interim system. | Undeterminable. Monetary benefits cannot be calculated until the Army and/or Congress decides if an interim system other than Dragon II will be fielded. |

## ACTIVITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED

### Office of the Secretary of Defense

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  
Washington, DC  
Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,  
Washington, DC

### Department of the Army

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research,  
Development and Acquisition), Washington, DC  
Office of the Secretary of the Army (Chief of Legislative  
Liaison), Washington, DC  
Program Executive Office for Fire Support,  
Redstone Arsenal, AL  
U.S. Army Missile and Space Intelligence Center,  
Redstone Arsenal, AL  
U.S. Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL  
U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity,  
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD  
U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory,  
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD  
U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria, VA

### Non-Defense Activity

General Accounting Office, Washington, DC

### Non-Government Activities

McDonnell Douglas Missile Systems Company, Arlington, VA  
McDonnell Douglas Missile Systems Company, St. Louis, MO  
Swiss Liaison Office, Redstone Arsenal, AL

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Program Executive Officer for Fire Support  
Project Manager for the Advanced Antitank Weapon System-Medium  
Project Manager for the Supplemental Interim Medium Antitank System

### Defense Agency

Director, Defense Logistics Agency

### Non-Defense Activities

Office of Management and Budget  
U.S. General Accounting Office, NSIAD Technical Information Center

### Congressional Committees:

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations  
Senate Committee on Armed Services  
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs  
Senate Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services  
House Committee on Appropriations  
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations  
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